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Roundtable Discussion
On February 24 and 25, 1989, the Cornell International Law Journal and
Cornell Law School hosted a symposium entitled "The United States-
Japanese Trade Relationship: An Interdisciplinary Approach for the
1990s." The Symposium concluded with a Roundtable Discussion. The
following persons participated:
* Victor Koschmann (Moderator): Acting Director, East Asia Studies
Program, Cornell University;
* Kent Calder: Associate Professor, Woodrow Wilson School of Public
and International Affairs, Princeton University;
* Harry First: Professor of Law, New York University Law School;
* John Haley: Director, Henry M. Jackson School of International
Studies, University of Washington;
* Gilbert B. Kaplan: Partner, Morrison & Foerster, Washington, D.C.;
formerly Acting Assistant Secretary for Import Administration, U.S.
Department of Commerce;
* Greg Mastel: Senior Legislative Assistant on Trade and Competitive-
ness, Senator Max Baucus (D-MT);
* TJ. Pempel: Professor of Government, Cornell University;
* RobertJ. Smith: Goldwin Smith Professor of Anthropology, Cornell
University;
* Ira Wolf: Legislative Assistant, Senator John D. Rockefeller IV (D.-
W.V.);
* Shotaro Yachi: Economic Counselor, Embassy ofJapan.
Prior to the Roundtable, the participants presented papers in
smaller panel discussions. In preparation for the Rountable theJournal
asked participants to consider the following question:
The United States-Japanese Trade dispute has been variously desribed as
"intractable," "irreconcilable," and "a permanent feature of the broader
bilateral relationship." Given the enormously complicated underpin-
nings of this dispute, what substantive steps should be taken toward
improved relations?
The participants responded with wide-ranging suggestions, from a
proposal for a major trade accord between the U.S. and Japan, to more
modest suggestions such as increasing the allocation of government
resources to the trade issue, creating an arbitration board for market
access issues, and increasing antitrust enforcement. In addition to these
specific proposals, several participants highlighted particular perspec-
tives from which the underlying dispute should be viewed, ranging from
economics to anthropology.
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Much of the most heated debate centered on the question of
whether the two nations should pursue a "process" or "results" ori-
ented trade strategy. Precisely describing these two approaches is diffi-
cult, since each contains a range of degrees and nuances. To
deliberately oversimplify, the more traditional "process" approach is
founded on free market principles and emphasizes reliance on the multi-
lateral process over bilateralism. More recent proposals for a "results"
oriented approach call for more active governmental management of
international trade, and frequently include suggestions for fixing numer-
ical "targets" for the export-import levels of certain products.
A court stenographer recorded the entire Roundtable event.
Remarks were edited by the participants and the Journal staff. TheJour-
nal added margin notes and footnotes to facilitate research.
PROFESSOR KOSCHMANN: I think it's entirely appropriate that
we're ending up with a Roundtable discussion. The Roundtable discus-
sion is a staple ofJapanese intellectual life and of publishing as well. A
Roundtable discussion often appears. in Japanese magazines on eco-
nomic and intellectual or political issues, and I think it's a credit to the
organizers that they have taken seriously the need for an exchange of
ideas.
We would like to focus on the problem of what is to be done. A
question has been distributed to the participants ahead of time.
Although we have already discussed aspects of what should be done in a
variety of ways, I think the focal points of discussion have been the scope
and nature of the problem. A number of differences have emerged in
that regard, so let me just remind us of a few of them.
One is whether the problem itself is bilateral or multilateral. Is it
feasible to focus just on the bilateral relationship, or from the beginning
does one have to include a multilateral dimension? Also, is it just a
trade problem or is it inherently a more complex, intersocietal problem,
which includes all sorts of political, cultural and other aspects as well?
And is it just a contemporary problem, or does it have to be seen in a
historical context? Finally is it more political-more a matter of percep-
tions and partial interests within the countries involved-than an eco-
nomic problem on either the macro or micro level?
These different conceptions of the problem, then, can provide the
foundations for different approaches to a solution. It's been suggested
that maybe we're doing all right now, so maybe the first question is: Is
some kind of new departure towards a solution necessary or is it ade-
quate to continue what's going on right now?
Is it feasible to stay in the multilateral realm? I believe Mr. Wallis,I
among others, suggested that the Uruguay round might offer the only
1. Honorable W. Allen Wallis, Former Under Secretary of State for Economic
Affairs, U.S. Department of State.
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possible forum in which to find a solution.2 Or does the issue inevitably
have to be addressed on a bilateral level, either with some kind of trade
agreement or with something else?
Is the macroeconomic level the most appropriate site for adjust-
ments, or is a piecemeal approach at a lower level necessary? Do cul-
tural factors constrain political and economic solutions? And is it
necessary at some point to distinguish tractables from intractables; as I
think Mr. Yachi has suggested;3 and, if so, what should be included in
each category?
These are, I think, some of the questions that we would like to
address, and as specifically as possible. I will ask the panelists to orient
their remarks toward specific measures so that in the end we'll have
results that are as concrete as possible.
I would like to begin by asking Mr. Mastel4 to say a little bit more, if
he wishes, about Senator Baucus's proposal for a bilateral trade and eco-
nomic agreement.5
MR. MASTEL: It seems to me that when you're talking about what
we do about Japan, it's a very difficult discussion to have in a vacuum.
There are a lot of factors that we have to consider. There are three that
I want to point out in particular before I go specifically into discussing
solutions.
[MACROECONOMIC BACKDROP]
First is that the macroeconomic environment has changed radically
in the last year or few years; the dollar has depreciated against the yen
by about 40 percent and that basically makes U.S. products a lot more
competitive on the Japanese market, so some of the market performance
problems that we've had in the past may begin to eliminate themselves-
certainly not all of them, but I think there will be some positive effect.
[URUGUAY ROUND OF GATT]
The second observation I would make is that we are now in the
middle of the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade'negotiations. Since
World War II certainly, or just after World War II, the GATT 6 has been
the centerpiece of U.S. trade policy. And you know it makes sense. It's
2. Wallis, Economics, Foreign Policy, and the United States-Japanese Trade Dispute, 22
CORNELL INT'L LJ. 381 (1989).
3. Shotaro Yachi, Economic Counselor, Embassy of Japan. See Yachi, BeYond
Trade Frictions: A New Horizon of United States-Japan Economic Relations, 22 CORNELL
INT'L LJ. 389 (1989).
4. Greg Mastel, Senior Legislative Assistance on Trade and Competitiveness,
Senator Max Baucus.
5. M. Baucus, A New Trade Strategy: The Case for Bilateral .greements, 22 CORNELL
INT'L L.J. 1 (1989).
6. General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs, 61 Stat. (5), (6), T.I.A.S. No. 1700,
55 U.N.T.S. 194. For the current version binding on the United States, see 4 BAsIC
INSTRUMENTS AND SELECTED DOCUMENTS 1 (1969).
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better to try to get an agreement with everyone in the world than to get
an agreement with just one nation because the economic benefits theo-
retically are going to be larger.
The problem is that we've never been able to rely on the GATT
system exclusively. Historically we've made a practice of negotiating
with Japan in the GATT, but also negotiating with them bilaterally; and
when it comes down to it, the most difficult, the most important negotia-
tions were done on a bilateral basis. And I think that's going to
continue.
There are some critical issues being discussed in the Uruguay
Round concerning agriculture, trade in services, intellectual property,
and some of those could have a positive impact on our problems with
Japan, but you'll notice that nowhere on the list are the problems we
talked about earlier: administrative guidance, distribution, any of the
cultural barriers. In short, we can't look to the GATT round to be a
complete solution. We're still going to need to have some kind of bilat-
eral discussions with Japan.
[TRADE ACT AND SUPER 301]
The third thing to keep in mind is that the trade landscape isn't the
same as it was last year. The U.S. passed the Omnibus Trade Act of
19887 which is basically a major rewrite of U.S. Trade Law. The most
important provision of the Act is probably what's called "Super 301."8
Super 301 is an attempt to sort of bundle all of a nation's unfair
trade practices together and address them in one section, with the threat
of U.S. retaliation if negotiations are not successful. And this provision
was written forJapan. I mean, there may be some questions at this point
about whether Japan will be targeted, but in all likelihood I think we
have to assume that they're going to be a target of Super 301. And thus
the question becomes not whether we're going to have bilateral talks
with Japan but rather in what context we're going to have bilateral talks
with Japan.
[NEED FOR MACROECONOMIC COORDINATION]
Now, it seems to me that we need a new trade strategy. We need an
agreement, or perhaps the better term is a strategy, and it seems to me it
has to have at least three prongs. The first is to continue to coordinate
macroeconomic policy: We have to keep the dollar at a reasonable
exchange rate against the yen; we have to control the U.S. budget defi-
cit, and we have to stimulate Japanese consumer demand if we're going
to have a hope of eliminating the deficit.
7. Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102
Sta. 1107, printed in 28 INT'L LEGAL MAT. 37 (Jan. 1989).
8. 1988 Trade Act, supra note 7, §§ 1301-10.
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I would say our results through macroeconomic coordination have
been encouraging. We've done a good job of coordinating economic
policy with the Japanese through the G-79 to change the dollar's
exchange rate; we've had some good results, I think, in stimulating the
Japanese economy. Certainly we can never expect a country to yield its
sovereignty totally to any kind of economic coordination mechanism,
but I think it is reasonable to expect that both countries can give trade
balances greater weight in making macroeconomic decisions.
[NEED FOR NEW TRADE STRATEGY]
Secondly, I think we need to have a new trade strategy. As Senator
Baucus has noted,' 0 it's hard to believe that anyone can call the current
approach a success. We have a whole lot of negotiations on a whole lot
of issues. The problem is that we really don't get to the bottom of it.
[NEED FOR TRADE TARGETS]
It may be possible in sectors like agriculture simply to continue to
reach process-oriented agreements and to achieve results. In certain
sectors the economic forces are so great that it's difficult for Japan to
maintain its farmers in business even with heavy government interven-
tion, but in a lot of sectors the comparative advantage differences are
more subtle, and I think the only way to break into that sort of system is
to have numerical targets as a guide for what we want to achieve. I'm
not suggesting that we abandon the market system, but we should use
targets as something to measure our success against in eliminating trade
barriers.
UAPAN AND FOREIGN AsSISTANCE]
Now, a third element that I would just suggest briefly would be for
Japan to put an increasing amount of its current account surplus into
foreign assistance, to solve things like the debt problem. I'll wrap it up
there to give other people a chance to talk.
MR. CALDER:" II think there's a lot that's useful in what Mr. Mas-
tel has just said. But I would want to relate that to a point of Mr. Yachi's
and also to something that I had stressed in my remarksl 2 -the distinc-
tion between tractables and intractables and the dangers in thinking
broadly, generically, and cross sectorally.
9. The G-7 is a ministerial level economic coordination group consisting of the
United States, Japan, West Germany, Britain, France, Canada, and Italy.
10. Baucus, supra note 5, at 3-7.
11. Kent Calder, Assistant Professor, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and
International Affairs, Princeton University.
12. See Calder, Domestic Political Transfonation and Trans-Pacific Trade Relations, 22
CORNELL INT'L LJ. 477 (1989).
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[MOVE TOWARD BILATERALISM]
I think we're going to be moving increasingly toward bilateralism in
U.S.-Japan relations, not because it's ideal but, because with 1992 and
the Europeans moving that way, international competitive dynamics may
force it.
[DANGER OF CARTELISTIC BEHAVIOR]
There is one caveat that I would make regarding bilateral agree-
ments, particularly those that are results-oriented, and that is the real
danger of cartelistic behavior. The U.S.-Japan high technology competi-
tion, while it has created tremendous imbalances, has also been a tre-
mendous engine of innovation for the world as a whole. Perhaps
because I come directly from Silicon Valley, I've seen both the costs and
the benefits of this competition. I think one of the most dangerous
things that we could possibly do is to stifle this engine of very dynamic
high technology competition between our two nations. The world as a
whole would lose tremendously. But as Mr. Mastel said, we do have to
find some means of reversing our worsening trade situation in high tech-
nology. I would like to see that done through more domestic assistance
to strategically crucial industries like semiconductors rather than
through support for cartelistic behavior.
[HIGH TECH DOMESTIC SUPPORT ASSISTANCE]
MR. WOLF:13 I also agree with what Mr. Mastel said, although I
have a couple of caveats. We all agree that multilateral trade negotia-
tions are of great importance, but one example where it's irrelevant to
Japan is intellectual property. The multilateral level of negotiations on
intellectual property deals mainly with guaranteeing that Third World
countries protect inventions, copyrights. Should we reach all our goals
at the multilateral level on intellectual property, it does not help us at all
in Japan. There are serious intellectual property problems in Japan
experienced by American and other foreign high tech companies, and
the solution can only be found on a bilateral basis. That's just one
example among many where the multilateral process is inappropriate to
the particular problems we have in Japan.
[RESULTS-ORIENTED NEGOTIATIONS]
There are different ways to define results-oriented negotiations.
One way is through statistical measures. Another way is through a deci-
sion as to whether things are moving in the right direction or not. The
telecommunications negotiations that we had with Japan several years
ago and that, to some extent, are continuing, are an example of this.
13. Ira Wolf, Legislative Assistant, SenatorJohn D. Rockefeller IV (D.-W.Va.).
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This also relates to what Glen Fukushima 14 discussed yesterday-the
resources that the U.S. Government is willing to commit to our negotia-
tions compared to the resources that the Japanese will use. Telecommu-
nications is the only set of negotiations where the U.S. Government was
willing to put in huge resources in people and money.
[U.S. NEED FOR MORE HUMAN RESOURCES]
Glen Fukushima is the only person at USTR dealing exclusively
with Japan, yet in these negotiations, the Executive Branch drew on a
number of agencies in a sustained way, using experts from the Federal
Communications Commission, the National Telecommunications and
Information Administration, the Department of Commerce, and else-
where, and putting these people inJapan for a week, two weeks, as long
as a month at a time.
We need to commit, in a sustained way, a corps of people dedicated
to specific negotiations, steeping themselves in the issue, developing
relationships with their counterparts inJapan, approaching the issue not
just at the bureaucratic level with the appropriate ministries, but also
dealing at the political level with the Liberal Democratic Party,
approaching the press in a way that we have never done before, dealing
with trade associations, which are usually ignored in trade negotiations
but which are a critical part of the decision-making process.
[NEED FOR MONITORING IMPLEMENTATION]
Once these negotiations are "successful" on paper, the next step is
monitoring implementation. This is as important as the actual negotia-
tions. For a while in telecommunications we maintained a group to fol-
low the implementation. Then we, as always, seem to have lost interest,
and now there is a sort of malaise in improving our access to the tele-
communications market in Japan because we have lost this sustained
attention. With sustained attention to implementation you can tell
whether there are results or not without having numerical goals at the
end of the day.
[NATURE OF NEGOTIATIONS]
Finally it is worth noting that although we talk about trade negotia-
tions, they are not really negotiations. Negotiations by definition
require two parties, with demands on each other and each making con-
cessions in order to reach an agreement. Glen Fukushima mentioned
yesterday that at the U.S.-Japan Trade Committee meetings he often has
as many as 38 items on his agenda. The Japanese generally have only
three or four. They have few if any demands relating to market access
14. Glen S. Fukushima, Deputy Assistant U.S. Trade Representative for Japan
and China, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative. See Fukushima, United States-
Japan Free Trade Area: A Skeptical T'ieo, 22 CORNELL INT'L LJ. 455 (1989).
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or trade policy. We are involved not in negotiations, but in discussions
where the U.S. is the demander and the Japanese are simply the
defender of the status quo. If you have nothing to trade off other than
good will or a commitment not to retaliate, it makes the tactics of negoti-
ations much more difficult than in other areas.
[CULTURAL MINDSET]
MR. HALEY:' 5 I'd like to go back several steps and suggest that
much of what has been said thus far represents a particular way of deal-
ing with problems. It reflects a mindset, a cultural mindset, that itself
hinders solutions that may be at hand. I would like to go back to what
Mr. Yachi had to say this morning. In his presentation, he suggested an
approach that we should heed carefully. There were two aspects to what
he said.' 6 Kent Calder has picked up on one; I would like to emphasize
the other.
[TRACTABLE VERSUS INTRACTABLE PROBLEMS]
The first was that we must begin to separate intractable from tracta-
ble problems, problems we can solve and those we can't; the second
was, very importantly, what does Japan seek? With those two points in
mind, let me go back to the cultural distinctions between how we
approach problems.
Thus far everyone has done what I suspect we are apt to do in
almost all instances. We begin by asking: Is there a problem? We then
define it: What is the problem? Next we assume there must be a solu-
tion and thus seek that special policy that solves or reduces the problem,
turning to the two, three, or four government officials present, and
begin to argue for what is inevitably a governmental or legal response.
That is not the way the Japanese would approach the issue. 17 I at least
think that is not the approach Mr. Yachi has suggested.
Hopefully without reading too much into his comments, what I
heard him say was there are some aspects of our environment over
which we have little, if any, control. In our relationship with Japan there
are aspects that are simply beyond solutions because they are outside
the control of any single firm, industry, and certainly the government.
What we must begin to understand, therefore, are the aspects of our
relationship that are subject to dynamic change, which we can't control,
and which we must therefore simply accept.
We must also appreciate the need to develop consensus in our rela-
tionship and to avoid coercive solutions, what Mr. Yachi sees as a coor-
15. John Haley, Professor of Law and East Asian Studies; Director, Henry M.
Jackson School of International Studies, University of Washington.
16. S. Yachi, supra note 3.
17. For a detailed explanation of this position, see Haley, Lurk, Lau,. Cu/tiye and
Trade: The Intractability of the United States-Japan Trade Conflicl, 22 CORNELL INT'L L.J.
403 (1989).
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dination of perceptions and of images. In the process, we should
attempt mutually to define what the problems and the issues are,
delineating between those that are intractable and those that can be
resolved jointly with a mutual better understanding of our interrelated-
ness. We should not demand Japan to do something, nor should Japan
demand that we do something.
[COORDINATING GOALS]
Mr. Yachi also suggested an avenue of approach to Japan by identi-
fying what Japan wants in our relationship. He said it many times:
Japan's quest for an honored place. Rather than walking into negotia-
tions with Japan and demanding 20 percent of their semiconductor mar-
ket, or this, that, and the other, whether a target or whether a contract,
we should accept the legitimacy ofJapan's desire for an honored place
in the world and emphasize how Japan gains the desired respect as we
work together to achieve mutual goals and interests. We must start, of
course, from a carefully developed consensus at home with respect to
what we ultimately want, what our ultimate goals are, and how disperate
interests and institutions can mutually work together in the process of
defining, building and then mutually acting upon such consensus.
[FTA1 8 AS THE WRONG APPROACH]
MR. KAPLAN:' 9 I think that the proposals to negotiate an FTA
with the Japanese, whatever the permutations, are not necessarily the
way to go. I think to some extent that may be more of the same. We
have had rather intensive negotiations under a series of rubrics since
1980.
I think there is a tremendous degree of scapegoating in the United
States, in the business community and in the political community, of
Japan. And certainly there are problems with Japan that have to be
solved, but I think that what we have to do, in a sense, is regroup, define
the problem, even though the task of this Roundtable is not to define
the problem, and figure out the seven or eight different steps that need
to be taken to resolve it.
I think Greg Mastel used the metaphor of a student about to take an
exam that he had done no reading for and he felt very troubled. I think
the metaphor that always comes to mind to me when we were negotiat-
ing trade agreements was a basketball team, and a basketball team that
may be behind. The question was whether we were going to be able to
regroup in the style of the old-fashioned Boston Celtics, somehow do all
the things that needed to be done as a country or as an economy or as a
18. "Free Trade Agreement."
19. Gilbert Kaplan, Partner, Morrison & Foerster, Washington, D.C.; formerly
Acting Assistant Secretary for Import Administration, U.S. Department of
Commerce.
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group of trade negotiators and get back into the game. It's not a simple
kind of solution; obviously, you can't just say, well, we're going to go out
and hire a great seven-foot-two center and that's going to solve the
problem.
[CONSERVATIVE USE OF TARGETS]
There are many different steps which have to be taken and I think
we as a country have to take all those steps. I would just outline very
briefly, because this is a big issue, what steps I think ought to be taken. I
don't think they include an FTA.
The steps I would recommend are first, that we adopt some market
share targets, but that we do it very, very sparingly. I think it would
make sense in areas like semiconductors, areas that I think are tractable,
but for a variety of reasons have just become intractable. We have to be
very careful about using market share targets because I think there are
tremendous down sides to doing it. The down sides are not very differ-
ent from the down sides of affirmative action or something like that. It
can be counterproductive: it's not market oriented; it forces people to
buy products they don't want to buy, can be very difficult; but I think in
some areas it should be done very sparingly.
[DISPUTE SETTLEMENT MECHANISM]
Secondly, as I mentioned in my talk, I think we should go back to
the Japanese in response to this general amorphous request they're
making about a bilateral dispute settlement mechanism, and talk about a
very specific dispute settlement mechanism related to market access
issues. This would not be in lieu of market share targets in some areas,
but in addition to it and conceivably used in other areas. I think there
should be a very quick arbitration system set up to deal with market
access problems. 20 There should be an agreement between the United
States and Japan that on market share problems like soda ash there
would be an arbitration system where we could get together and try to
reach a solution relatively quickly. I think the system ought to be tried
on a relatively short-term trial basis, two years, three years, in terms of
setting up the system. The arbitrations themselves should take place
more quickly. We ought to see whether it works.
[MAKING TRADE A PRIORITY]
There's been a subtheme running through the conference, I think,
that we need to intensify our efforts with respect to trade. In other
words, we need as a country to refocus our priorities, perhaps, away
from classical "foreign policy," away from defense policy, away from tax
20. For a more detailed explanation of Mr. Kaplan's proposal, see Kaplan, The Use
of Arbitration to Resolve larket Access Disputtes, 22 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 469 (1989).
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policy, away from other things and start looking at trade. I think that's
clearly correct. I think that we have, as a government and as a country,
not cared enough about the trade issue, not cared enough about our
position internationally. We're basically a small island nation-not
small, but an island nation by virtue of geography. Europe is way over
there and Japan is way over there; Korea is way over there. Obviously,
we're no longer an island nation. We have to look at the trade issue as
seriously as we looked at the other issues in our country over the last 10
or 20 years.
[BUDGET DEFICIT]
I think we have to solve the budget deficit. I don't think there's
anyone on this panel that doesn't believe that would be the biggest sin-
gle factor in terms of turning around our trade picture. That simply has
to be solved. And I think the Congress which writes the budget should
solve that problem and then all the other problems would be taken care
of. Just two other things quickly.
[ExPORT FINANCING]
I think we ought to provide export financing for United States busi-
ness equivalent to whatever any other country will do. In other words,
we ought to match export financing dollar for dollar or yen for yen with
any other foreign country. I think that's tremendously important and
when companies are actually competing for sales, over and over again
they will tell you we could have gotten the sale but the-and put injapa-
nese, Brazilians, Germans, French-provided export financing which we
could not match.
[INTENSIFICATION OF BUSINESS EFFORTS]
Finally, I think this is not all a government problem. There has to
be a major intensification in the business community, too, with respect
to getting into foreign markets. The business sector will have to get into
foreign markets. Companies like Hewlett-Packard know that. They're
already very successful internationally.
The question for other companies is will they wait until they have
lost a great deal of market share in the United States and they're really
going under before they realize that they have to be able to compete
internationally, or will they get out in front of the curve. In other words,
will they start right now investing in the long term in foreign markets
and will they put the kind of effort and money into that that is necessary
to be successful?
One way or another they're going to have to do it. American com-
panies will have to do it. I hope they do it now and not wait for 15 years
until it will get harder and they'll be even further behind the curve.
They have to intensify their efforts and really go out there. That will
Cornell International Law Journal
probably be more important or as important as anything the U.S. Gov-
ernment can do.
So that is the sort of system that I would think ought to be put into
place to turn this problem around.
[FUTURE POLICY]
MR. YACHI:2 1 With regard to what should be done in the future,
Mr. Mastel mentioned three fields, one is macroeconomic policy coordi-
nation and the second is multilateral trade negotiations, what we call
Uruguay Round, and the third is a bilateral approach. Now, I do not
have an objection to the former two approaches or fields, the
macroeconomic policy and multilateral trade negotiations, but I have a
reservation about the third approach-the bilateral negotiations or bilat-
eral approach. Mr. Mastel mentioned Super 301,22 but I don't think that
Super 301 can be an answer to improving the bilateral trade
relationship.
[BILATERAL TRADE HISTORY]
Let me say a little bit about our bilateral trade history after the war.
From World War II until 1964, the United States had been showing a
substantial trade surplus vis-d-vis Japan. The year 1965 was a turning
point from whichJapan has been showing the trade surplus vis-a-vis the
United States. And up until now we have taken a lot of measures to
open up our markets, but still the trend remains in favor of Japan in
terms of trade balance.
[YEN-DOLLAR EXCHANGE RATES]
As to the exchange rate between the yen and dollar, the Japanese
yen was appreciated by almost 50 percent since the Plaza Agreement of
September, 1985. At that time one dollar equaled approximately 250
yen; right now one dollar equals approximately 125 yen. Although we
have that kind of a very favorable environment for the promotion of
exports to Japan, we have not yet seen very encouraging signs in the
area of bilateral trade.
[RECOMMENDED U.S. ACTION]
What we have to do right now is, on the part of the United States,
make serious efforts to reduce the budget deficit and also take measures
to encourage savings and capital investment. And the United States
business group should promote further their sales efforts. Many Ameri-
can companies have succeeded in the Japanese market: The shaving
razor company Schick is occupying a 70 percent share of the Japanese
21. See supra note 3.
22. See supra note 8.
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safety razor market; Polaroid occupies 70 percent of our instant photog-
raphy market share; Coca-Cola occupies 62 percent of the soft drinks
market in Japan; Johnson & Johnson, 28 percent; and other markets-
IBM in computers, 27 percent; DelMonte, the tomato juice company, 23
percent, and so on.
[RECOMMENDED JAPANESE ACTIONS]
So, excellent American companies are enjoying their great share in
Japan. Now, on the part ofJapan, I think we should transform our basic
economic structure from an export-oriented economy to a domestic-
demand-lead economy, and during the past two or three years our econ-
omy has experienced great transformation in this direction, which was
appreciated by the Western Summit countries, the G-7 23 and so on.
Japan is also now promoting the so-called "internationalization"-which
seeks to open up more of our minds to the outside world, to further
open our markets; I think this internationalization movement should be
strengthened and enhanced even further.
[FREE TRADE AGREEMENT]
Let me say a few words about FTA, Free Trade Agreement. Right
now, I don't think that the FTA is a feasible idea for the two countries
because of its potential impact on the world economy. If the U.S. and
Japan-the first and second largest economies in the world-combined,
it would have a great impact on the world economy. Asian countries,
particularly Asian NIEs,2 4 would not welcome a U.S.-Japan FTA because
it may become a huge trade group which is exclusive against those Asian
NIEs and ASEAN 25 countries.
But what I'd like to say about the FTA is that it can be seen as the
ideal for the future-perhaps to be realized ten years down the road, but
that in the short run, we should make further efforts to open up our
markets, try to reduce any kind of barriers to our trade, and cooperate in
macroeconomic policy coordination and multilateral trade negotiations.
[TRADE DEFICIT ORIGINS]
MR. PEMPEL:2 6 I'd like to pick up on one important thing that
we've sort of lost sight of, and that is the fact that in any effort to deal
with the bilateral trade balance we have to go back to that critical date
that Mr. Yachi was talking about-1965. That year represented a turn-
ing point at which the U.S. ceased to be an exporter of goods to Japan
and became an importer from Japan. That event and the subsequent
23. See supra note 9.
24. "Newly Industrialized Economies."
25. ASEAN, the Association of South-East Asian Nations, includes Brunei, Indo-
nesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand.
26. T.J. Pempel, Professor of Government, Cornell University.
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occurrence of the United States running a trade deficit with virtually
every major region of the world, not just Japan but Latin America,
Africa, the Middle East, et cetera, hinges, it seems to me, on the efforts by
the Johnson administration to run the Vietnam war on a credit card.
[U.S. Focus ON MILITARY INDUSTRIES]
The United States has gone through some real ebbs and flows since
that time period, but it seems to me that one of the fundamental direc-
tions that was set was the ever escalating rate of spending for the mili-
tary. It became very clear, certainly by '65, to electronics goods
manufacturers, to the aerospace industry, to a good number of com-
puter companies and certainly to engineers graduating from American
universities, that there was a lot more money to be made by servicing the
American defense establishment than there was in serving the world of
consumers in electronics goods, aerospace, and what have you.
["MILITARY KEYNESIANISM"]
And I think that if we're going to take a look at some of the shifts in
the economy, we have to keep in mind causes of the current budget defi-
cit, which rest very heavily on a massive expansion in defense and the
fact that the United States has been building a kind of military keyne-
sianism over a long period of time, expecting that somehow putting
more money into the military is going to allow the United States econ-
omy to do better rather than to do worse. And I think the consequences
of that policy are only now beginning to be felt, and they're beginning to
be felt in the fact that we no longer have the kind of infrastructure that
allows the United States to be as competitive in civilian export goods as
we once were. The United States does very well exporting military air-
craft to the rest of the world. Our only major competitors there are the
French and British. And the unfortunate part of that to the United
States is that we've let our bridges, our roads, our educational system,
our crime rate, our drug problem, our engineering graduation rates,
and a whole variety of other things to be chopped out from underneath
us. Regardless of what the actual causes of those specific problems are,
it seems to me there's got to be a fundamental redress in America's
spending policies and spending priorities.
It seems to me that Gorbachev in the Soviet Union is beginning to
realize the mistakes of the Soviet approach to economics and is looking
forward to cutting back Soviet expenditures on the military because of
the consequences that has had for the civilian economy. The United
States is now in a position politically and strategically where it can begin
to do the same. And if it makes some adjustments in that direction, and
if engineers coming out of major schools in the United States realize
that there's money to be made in the civilian sector as well as the mili-
tary sector, and if the United States has an infrastructure supportive of
well-trained individuals going into civilian technology, manufacturing
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and the like, then we're going to be in a much better position to solve
the trade problems overall than we are trying to bang down the door of
Japan (a country that seems to have its infrastructure very well in place),
and hence be much more capable of competing world-wide than we've
allowed ourselves to become. 27
MR. FIRST:28 It's the web-less seam, it goes on forever. All those
things seem to be quite right. I was thinking of the amount of capital we
now allocate to the takeover business, so I guess depending on where
you're looking at it you can see different things.
[INADVISABILITY OF MARKET SHARE QUOTAS]
I would just like to make a few comments. In fact, getting back to
what Kent Calder said at the beginning, I would agree with his caveats,
or particularly the caveat relating to the inadvisability of market share
quotas, and with what Gil Kaplan said, except I'd like to go a step fur-
ther and say we really shouldn't do it at all. It seems to me this is a very
bad step for the U.S. to take as a negotiating tactic, although it seems to
offer some obvious short-term benefit.
I'm concerned frankly not so much aboutJapan, but about the U.S.
and the spillover effect that it will inevitably have, I think, on policy that
we adopt in the U.S. towards our own domestic economy. It doesn't
surprise me, frankly, that business is supporting this. I think in their
heart of hearts, U.S. business firms would be happy with guaranteed
shares ofJapanese markets in the various areas. They could, just sort of
live a rather easier life.
In a number of our trade agreements those things just don't go one
way, and we've seen that in certain important areas we've been willing to
accept guaranteed market shares of our markets. I can't speak for the
psyche ofJapanese managers, whether they're happy with whatever per-
centage share of the automobile industry they have. But I think that's a
dangerous way to go. I keep thinking that firms that don't want affirma-
tive action in the workplace, want it the marketplace; it leads me to be a
little concerned.
[NEGOTIATIONS TIME FRAME]
The second point concerns the issue of what form should we take in
our negotiations-macro, micro, sector specific? Despite what I said
yesterday about slow progress in five years, there is some progress. We
could perhaps accuse ourselves of the same thing that we accuse busi-
ness people of, which is having too short of a time frame and that maybe
27. For a more detailed description of Mr. Pempel's views, see Pempel, The Trade
Inbalance Is Not the Problem, 22 CORNELL INT'L LJ. 435 (1989).
28. Harry First, Professor of Law, New York University School of Law.
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one thing is to slug it out a little longer or a lot longer in the trenches of
different sectors that seem to be a particular problem.
[DEFINING "MARKET PROBLEMS"]
The third aspect of what I'd like to respond to, I guess, is in defin-
ing the problem, and I'd like us to look, more frankly, at what market
problems actually are. Not that semiconductor prices are too low.
That's a manifestation of a problem, but it's not the problem. Not that
our shares in a certain market in Japan are too low. That strikes me as a
manifestation of a problem.
[ANTITRuST LAW AS BEST REMEDY]
We have to look for what's causing that. It's not always easy to find
out, but I think to some extent it's private cartels operating in Japan, not
that we're free of cartel practices in the U.S. But I would suggest, to
sound a theme, perhaps a theme I know, that we don't need a new arbi-
tration process like Gil Kaplan was suggesting for market access; there is
a law in Japan for market access against private cartel action. Maybe we
should press Japan to enforce it more and maybe we should press our
own government to enforce our own market access laws, the antitrust
laws, against cartel practices by Japanese firms who target U.S. markets,
or against U.S. firms who act to exclude foreign firms, which does hap-
pen as well. So, I'd like to see that across the board as a structural way
of trying to get us to the result that we really ought to be getting to,
which is competetively-structured markets, that the push of competi-
tion-not quotas-is going to bring us those new products that none of
us can predict today, that people couldn't have predicted 10 years ago.
That creative destruction, in the end, is going to get us all the advance-
ment we need, but not quotas. 29
[THE ROLE OF CULTURE]
MR. SMITH:30 I feel obliged to re-raise the flag of culture.3 ' I've
noticed not just in the context of this conference but in general a ten-
dency, if anybody bothers to talk about culture at all, to imply that it's
something they've got and we don't. Furthermore, culture is often por-
trayed as a barrier that they raise and we have to get them to remove.
We have a culture, too. Some of the comments this afternoon have
touched on that, but I don't think in any very profound way. Let me try
to pick up on several issues that have come up over the three panel ses-
29. For a more detailed description of Mr. First's views, see First, The I'iewf'om
1984: What Have We Learned in Five Years?, 22 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 509 (1989).
30. Robert J. Smith, Goldwin Smith Professor of Anthropology, Cornell
University.
31. See Smith, Culture as Explanation: Neither.All Nor Nothing, 22 CORNELL INT'L L.J.
425 (1989).
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sions and this Roundtable. Allen Wallis last night referred to practices
or institutions encrusted with tradition.32 The obvious message was that
we must chip off the encrustation and move those institutions into the
modem world. I suggest that if we chip off the encrustation, we could
find there is nothing at the center.
What the cultural approach requires is that you always have to try to
keep in mind why you're saying what you're saying, why you're taking
the position you're taking, but more important, why whoever it is you're
arguing with or discussing the issues with is taking the position that they
do. Let me give you an example. There was a halcyon day (from the
American point of view) when the United States was buying up Canada.
An American friend of mine who worked in Montreal remarked that she
was going to give up her job and go into the newspaper business simply
to write headlines about U.S.-Canadian trade relations. She had become
so irritated, she said, because the headline invariably read "Americans
buying up supermarket chain," and never read "Canadians selling out
supermarket chain."
[NEED FOR LANGUAGE TRAINING]
There are so many things about our relationship which has been so
intimate in so many different ways for so very long that I think we've
neglected to check back from time to time and remember exactly where
we've been and how far we've come. We have made no advance in one
respect. Were this conference and Roundtable held in Tokyo, spon-
sored by a Japanese university, with all Japanese participants, I dare say
the representative from the American embassy would not participate in
Japanese. In that regard we're not getting anywhere. Years ago Profes-
sor Eleanor Jorden of Cornell was called to Washington to a meeting
with a couple of people in the White House. They offered a suggestion
about how we might begin to adjust and correct for our inability in the
language area. They had a proposal that there be established in the
United States a program that would offer six months of Japanese lan-
guage training to 10,000 trainees who would then qualify for admission
to Japanese universities. She assumed that she had misheard them or
that her English was failing and asked them to repeat the proposal. Of
course, nothing ever came of it.
[TRANSCENDING SYMBOLICS]
But I think there's a much more fundamental issue. It really does
behoove any person in the United States, any American of good will, to
try to do something about the symbolics of this situation, an issue that
was raised this morning during the panel discussion. When we say the
Japanese are buying up real estate in the United States, and when Andy
Rooney on 60 Minutes can actually do a little Japan-bashing on just that
32. Wallis, supra note 2.
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theme, it is a very dangerous situation. The figures are not put in per-
spective; the recency of the Japanese investment as opposed to British
and Dutch investment, et cetera, is not emphasized. We talk about
Japan's free ride on defense, and we talked about burden sharing, which
Mr. Yachi very appropriately suggested we stop talking about.33 We are
permitting the tone of this discourse to run wild in this country.
[FUTURE SECURITY IMPLICATIONS]
But there's a more important point altogether. This is the end of
the '80s. Is there anyone at this table or in this room who imagined for a
minute at the end of the '70s what the '80s have turned out to look like
vis-d-vis relations between our country and many other countries in the
world? I think not.
This touches on the issue of security, which keeps intruding into
our discussion of trade relations. Suppose for a moment that by the end
of the '90s the Japanese have come to what seems to me a perfectly pos-
sible, plausible conclusion that the security issue is dead; who would
imagine that any other power would choose to challenge Japan's sover-
eignty militarily in the 1990s? I for one find the notion inconceivable.
Suppose by the end of the 1990s a formula that a friend and I worked
out in New York over this last weekend had come to fruition. I said,
"Well, the United States and the Soviet Union have bankrupted each
other in an arms race, the Japanese are at the moment bailing us out,
who's going to bail out the Soviet Union?" He said, "West Germany, of
course. Because they cannot afford chaos to their east." I think that's
an absolutely plausible prediction. My Japanese business friends always
tell me that they are astonished by the inevitability in talking with Ameri-
cans, that the Americans will extrapolate from the present into the dis-
tant future, when we should know that that's a very culturally
determined thing to do, and it is a very dangerous thing to do in the
rapidly shifting international context that we live in.
[U.S. PRODUCTION IN JAPAN]
MR. MASTEL: I just wanted to make three quick observations that
struck me listening to this discussion. The first is in reference to my
good friend Mr. Yachi's impressive list of American companies that have
done very well in Japan: Polaroid, IBM, Coca-Cola. And to that I will
add a few like Honeywell; certainly there have been some U.S. busi-
nesses that have done well in Japan.
Unfortunately, if you look at those businesses, most of their produc-
tion is based in Japan, not in the U.S. The problem is that Americans
are not satisfied with simply having products that have American names
selling injapan. What we're looking for are American products manufac-
tured in America that are sold in Japan. The requirement for cracking the
33. See Yachi, supra note 3, at -.
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Japanese market should not be basing your production facilities in
Japan. That's really the central theme.
[BROADENING DEFINITION OF NATIONAL SECURITY]
The second thing is we've been talking about national security here
and how that has to play a role in our relations with Japan. Certainly,
that's true. I think the problem is that we define national security far too
narrowly and certainly in military terms. In order to continue to be a
great nation, to be a military power, we have to have a thriving economy.
If we allow our economic strength to be undermined by a trade deficit
and poor economic policies, we eventually will not be able to export our
military strength. I think economic security is a fundamental part of our
national economy. We should never try to make a dichotomy. These
are elements of the same issue, just a few years removed.
[NEED FOR TRADE TARGETS]
The third observation I would make is about the topic of targets
which has been tossed about here a great deal* I guess I would summa-
rize targets as the worst possible approach to trade except for every
other possible approach. Targets certainly should be a last option. And
they are a last option.
[TARGETS VERSUS PROCESS APPROACH]
We've tried to get process-oriented solutions to Japanese trade
problems for what, 20 years, 25 years? The problem is that it hasn't
worked and we're left with no other alternative. It's been demonstrated
time and time again in dispute after dispute that the American approach
of trying for process normally doesn't work, and so we have to have
some alternative--or we have to be able to live with the trade deficit.
And I don't think we can live with the trade deficit.
There were two examples used by speakers yesterday to compare
the managed trade approach to the free trade approach: semiconduc-
tors were used as an example of managed trade, with the conclusion that
managed trade is generally a bad idea; and soda ash was used as an
example of the free trade solution, with the conclusion that that's the
direction we should go in.
From my experience with these two industries, I think they couldn't
disagree more. The semiconductor industry, although not happy with
the Japanese enforcement of the market access provisions, thinks the
agreement is a good one and sees it as the only way to break into the
Japanese market after years of trying process-oriented solutions. It is
the only measure that has demonstrated any success. The soda ash peo-
ple are still held to less than 20 percent of theJapanese soda ash market
even though their costs are 50 percent below Japanese producers. In
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other words, the process-oriented approach has not worked in that
example. And I think the industry's attitude demonstrates this.
[CONSISTENCY REGARDING MARKET INTEGRATION]
MR. HALEY: I have to respond. When you say that Honeywell
Japan cannot be counted as a U.S. product but Nissan Tennessee can't
be counted as a U.S. product either, I have problems. Either we accept
that we are becoming integrated and that it doesn't make a difference
whether Honeywell as a U.S. firm is manufacturing in Japan or whether
Nissan as a Japanese firm is manufacturing in Tennessee, or at least be
consistent in treating a Nissan truck manufactured in the U.S. as a U.S.
product and a Honeywell computer manufactured in Japan as a Japanese
product. There has to be some consistency.
[TRADE DEFICIT NOT WORST PROBLEM]
Nor am I persuaded that the trade deficit is our most critical prob-
lem. How large is our current trade deficit in historical or comparative
terms? The republic has withstood, I suspect, worse deficits without
great difficulty, and with trading partners like Great Britain, with whom
we have managed to maintain reasonably good relationships. Are we
really concerned with the deficit or rather simply with what consumers
may prefer in each others' markets? A response that at some point down
the road disaster will lower the standard of living, and therefore some-
thing now has to be done is not persuasive. I can think of many worse
scenarios.
[NEED TRADE WITH JAPAN]
One is for us to have very little trade with Japan or for our bilateral
trade to recede to the level it was 10, 15, or 20 years ago. Were that to
happen we would both be much worse off. Or what ifJapan decided not
to buy our T-bills, but rather decided to bail out the Soviet Union and
started to invest there? In short, there are worse problems.
[TREND TOWARD ECONOMIC INTEGRATION]
MR. PEMPEL: Just very briefly following up on the point that John
Haley made. I think one of the other issues that we have to keep in mind
is the fact that not only are Japanese companies investing in the U.S. and
U.S. companies investing injapan, each of which changes the notion of a
trade balance or imbalance, but we have to recognize that more and
more we're seeing the integration of a Japanese parent company with an
American company and vice versa.
GM/Toyota in California is one such joint manufacturing opera-
tion, Chrysler and Mitsubishi Colt, Ford and Mazda are others. The
auto industry is breaking, it seems to me, no longer along U.S. versus
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Japanese versus presumably Korean lines, but we're beginning to see
the cross-national integration of firms that's going to eventually pit a
GM/Toyota complex against a Ford/Mazda complex, et cetera.
The same thing is happening in the computer industry. It's likely to
happen in numerous others. And I think the continual focus on what
you put on a ship or what you put on a plane and sail or fly to another
country is at best a very, very partial component of a much more compli-
cated, dynamic, and integrated economic relationship. To focus exclu-
sively on what gets on the plane and the ship and which direction the
cargo is transported is to lose sight of that much broader problem.3 4
[NEED FOR SECTORAL ANALYSIS]
MR. CALDER: I think Tj. Pempel has a point that's right at the
heart of this whole discussion, but hasn't been highlighted enough:
What we have here are two nations with different political systems and
interest group structures, that are becoming one economy. This emerg-
ing reality inevitably forces upon us a broad range of policy coordina-
tion issues. The fundamental issue that we really have to look at goes far
beyond trade. It goes to the tax policies of individual nations.
Obviously, the trade policies, the government finance policies, the
tax policies, and the defense policies of nations have competitive conse-
quences in an interdependent global economy, which brings me to one
concrete proposal: the creation of sector-specific policy coordination
groups in the two countries, composed of both private-sector represent-
atives and government officials in the two nations. It is important to
involve economists as well as politically sensitive analysts in both
nations, to look at divergences in policy with regard to key sectors and
to begin to think about how policies can be synchronized. I would say
tax policies probably are the most fundamental of these areas for
coordination.
I do disagree with targets. It seems to me that what we should be
talking about, certainly for the long run, is policy coordination-sector-
specific policy coordination rather than specific targets.
[IMPORTANCE OF RESULTS VERSUS PROCESS DEBATE]
MR. WOLF: I'm a little picture, short-run person, and if we can't
get past the short run, there's not going to be a long run. The short
run's getting bad vis-d-vis U.S.-Japan relations. The original question
for this two-hour session was what can be done to improve relations,
and I think it is worth talking for a few minutes about results versus
process because this is going to become a major issue of debate. Recent
reports have focused on this, and anyone who's interested in this should
34. For a more detailed description of this view, see Pempel, supra note 27, at-.
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read Clyde Prestowitz's book Trading Places3 5 because he is an intellec-
tual father of this concept. I agree there is a danger with the specific
dollar figure, results oriented concept.
[IMPORTANCE OF TRADE DEFICIT]
To improve relations right now, there's nothing more important
than the bilateral trade deficit. There are other serious bilateral and
multilateral problems that relate to the U.S.-Japan relationship, but the
trade problem right now is the most important, the most emotional, and
the one that is getting the most serious attention in Washington.
[SODA ASH EXAMPLE]
Part of the solution to this relates to resources and follow-up. Take
the soda ash issue that's been mentioned half a dozen times during this
conference, where we are now stuck at 20 percent of the market. We
believe that, by all measures, we should have a far greater share of this
market. We sell it cheaper. It is an undifferentiated product, so quality
is not an issue. We have done very little in the last five years to follow
up on this. We haven't pursued it. We put considerable resources into
this issue in the 1980s and then we virtually dropped it. Thus why
should Japan, given everything we know about decision-making there,
do anything about this voluntarily?
[U.S. FAILURE TO COMMIT GOVERNMENT RESOURCES]
If the U.S. does not maintain an interest in this specific trade prob-
lem to the end-to the point of sale-why should the Japanese be the
ones to take the initiative? We are stopping at the wrong time, not put-
ting in the resources, people and commitment at the higher levels of the
U.S. Government that are necessary.
[MUTUAL INTERESTS]
The United States still has tremendous leverage over Japan. Japan
has tremendous leverage over the United States. Japan has not used its
leverage thus far, and we have not used ours. I would contend there is
plenty of room for us to use that leverage in a positive direction to
resolve an issue that is just as much in Japan's interests to resolve as it is
ours. Japan would like to have the trade problems resolved; they're will-
ing to bear certain costs to have that problem resolved. It does not
serve Japan's national interest to have the emotional debate we see now
in the United States, to have these frictions, but Japan is unable to take
the initiative and the U.S. has been unwilling to take the sustained initia-
tive that's necessary.
35. C. PRESTOWITZ, TRADING PLACES: How WE ALLOWED JAPAN TO TAKE THE
LEAD (1988).
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[U.S. COMPETITIVENESS]
MR. KAPLAN: Well, I would begin by saying all is not lost. I think
sometimes you listen to these discussions about Japan and about U.S.
industry and you have this feeling that, you know, we are roughly com-
petitive with some of the very poor economies of sub-Saharan Africa and
who knows how we're ever going to get back and that's just simply not
the case. And I think it's very important to keep that in mind. We have
certainly the supreme world class agricultural industry, construction
industry, I would argue computer industry and I think most Japanese
would agree, medical and pharmaceutical, biotechnology, housing, the
list goes on and on and on. We don't like to compete. We don't like to
have to sit down and realize that it's not 1965 where for whatever reason
we were absolutely supreme, both militarily and in terms of the growth
rate of our economy, that there are other people who are catching up
and that was really inevitable.
It's not an all or nothing sort of situation, though,, and the indus-
tries are going to have to keep on competing and governments are
going to have to take steps to make sure trade is focused on.
[MANAGED TRADE]
In a way what we're saying is everything else hasn't worked all that
well, so let's do managed trade, that's going to work. We're going to
put percentages on everything. Well, about two years ago, everybody
said "the dollar," the U.S. industry said "the dollar." Just imagine if we
were sitting here two years ago and Mr. Yachi were nice enough to say,
"We will let you put a 40 percent tariff on all goods coming in from
Japan into the United States. A 40 percent tariff, we agree." That's
really to some extent what has happened with respect to currency reval-
uation and vice versa in terms of goods going intojapan. But that didn't
solve the problem. I think there's a tremendous temptation to get neat
solutions in Washington, solutions which sound like they're going to do
something when, in fact, they really will not.
[CARTELIZATION]
I'll just close by making a comment about managed trade. One of
the programs that I managed was the President's steel program and
about a year into my job managing that, the Japanese trade group in
charge of steel came in and the head of that group said, "You know,
there's a grave problem. The traditional market share of the Japanese in
the United States is being worn away by the Koreans. We used to have a
5.5 percent share and now some of our traditional customers are being
taken away by the Koreans and you have to do something about it."
The message is that to a large extent any country or company would
like guaranteed market shares both in their own country and abroad.
We can then all argue about traditional shares and historically tradi-
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tional shares, but as Harry First and other people have said, what that
will mean is cartelized trade and not economic advancement for both
countries as a whole, so we have to remain wary of that kind of solution
despite the fact that it seems to have a lot of syntactic certainty.
[BusINESS INTERESTS]
MR. FIRST: I'd like to give a little sort of caution on always taking
the prescription that we get from business people. I think that as trade
negotiators it's probably inevitable and very difficult to resist this, but-
and this goes to what Greg Mastel was saying-I don't think we should
measure the utility of either the semiconductor approach, if we want to
call it that, and the soda ash approach,3 6 by what the industry tells us.
No doubt the semiconductor industry is happier now than they were
before. I mean, that makes sense; prices are higher. They're not happy,
I don't think, with their share ofJapan's domestic market, which I don't
think has changed.
[COSTS OF MANAGED TRADE]
One of the problems, I think, with this sort of managed trade solu-
tion is the opportunity cost. It may mask the fact that the solutions lie
elsewhere. To me the question to ask when the semiconductor people
come in and complain about low prices is, "Why were the prices low and
what is the economics of it? What are the market forces that are driving
it?"
[NEED FOR ANTIrrRuST ENFORCEMENT]
On the soda ash side, I agree with Ira Wolf. I think we've sort of
lost pressure there. I think there are still collusive practices in Japan
which I think the private industry has trouble surfacing because it
involves their own customers. So, perhaps somewhat facetiously I'd like
to suggest we post people from our own antitrust agencies who don't
seem to have much to do, over to the Fair Trade Commission and let's
get some antitrust enforcement going. That's only partially facetious.
[IMPORTANCE OF SITE OF MANUFACTURING]
MR. MASTEL: Just two quick points. First addressing Mr. Haley's
earlier comment about the relative value of goods, American goods
manufactured here and American goods manufactured abroad. 37 Obvi-
ously, Nissan Tennessee should be considered an American car manu-
facturer. That's not a double standard. The problem I was pointing out
is that for the most part, most of the U.S. businesses that have been
successful in Japan have only been successful after they were forced to
36. For an explanation of these two approaches, see First, supra note 29.
37. See supra Mr. Haley's discussion at page 536.
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move most of their production to Japan. And we do, as a nation, have to
be concerned about where the manufacturing base is. When the manu-
facturing base moves abroad, so do the jobs associated with manufactur-
ing, and those are generally high-paying, good-quality jobs. As a nation
and as a matter of national policy, we do have to be concerned where the
manufacturing actually takes place for that reason.
[CONSISTENCY OF TARGETS AND MARKETPLACE]
Quickly back over to the managed trade, targets approach, the first
thing I'd like to point out is that I don't think targets necessarily must be
called managed trade-you don't have to initially go that far, in other
words. As Mr. Wolf was pointing out, results don't necessarily mean
targets in all cases. You can use a results-oriented policy that doesn't set
market share targets. Furthermore, a market share target doesn't neces-
sarily mean that you abandon the marketplace. Instead, a marketplace
target can be used as an indicator of whether or not barriers have been
removed. In other words, if the U.S. has a 20 percent share of the semi-
conductor market everywhere else in the world, we can use that 20 per-
cent share in the Japanese market as a bench mark to whether or not our
negotiations to eliminate trade barriers are succeeding or not. And
that's probably the most effective way to use targets.
[FAILURE OF PROCESS APPROACH]
Certainly I would agree we should pursue other options, all other
options, before we go to the approach of using targets and results-ori-
ented policy. What you have to keep in mind is we're already at that
point. We've been using the process approach for 25 years and it has
not succeeded by and large.
[NATURE OF "AMERICAN" PRODUCTS]
MR. WOLF: I have a bit of advice for Mr. Yachi. You used the
wrong list for the $25 billion dollars that we sell to Japan. It's not all
agricultural items. There are many American companies producing in
the U.S. who sell to Japan and sell successfully, not as many as there
should be, and they don't sell as much as they should. But when you use
your list of American successes in Japan, it only serves to enrage Ameri-
cans for the reasons that we have already discussed here. Coca-Cola is a
name, not a product that's being sold.
[TARGETS LESS OBJECTIONABLE]
MR. CALDER: It just occurs to me that the clarification that we've
seen with regard to the results-oriented policies has been very helpful.
The opposition that I think several of us have had was particularly to
quantity-oriented policies, particularly if they are used as sort of a sole
indicator and if they somehow become institutionalized. If monitoring
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the results ofJapanese policies is a subjective sort of thing, if the Con-
gressional judgment is just one of many indicators, then I think it may
well be useful, as one bench mark among many.
[NEED FOR SECTORAL ANALYSIS]
But it does strike me that at the same time it's important for us to
broaden our analysis of sectoral trends, to look not only at results per
se, but also to supplement that with deeper analysis of sector-specific
policies on both sides of the Pacific, to understand both the concrete
differences in policies with regard to particular sectors and the economic
implications of those differences. In semiconductors, for example, the
VLSI research cartel at some point obviously had long-run impact on
subsequent trade patterns, since the U.S. failed to take similar support
measures on behalf of our industry. The regional policies ofJapan have
likewise had impact on trade. Depreciation policies have had an impact.
In all cases, these Japanese policies haven't been offset in the United
States; if we had better understandings in both countries of these differ-
ences, I think that we would better appreciate where our problems lie.
[PROBLEM OF DISPLACED WORKERS]
MR. WOLF: A number of speakers have talked about the fact that
growth in one sector in one part of the country does not satisfy the
worker in another area of the country who has lost his job because of
Japanese imports or imports from another country. This is an area
where a proper social policy in the United States would go a long way to
resolve the political problems of trade imbalances.
I work for a senator from West Virginia, and in West Virginia we
have many thousands of unemployed coal miners. When I was talking to
an official at MITI38 about this one day, he couldn't understand what I
was talking about. He couldn't understand how you could have an
unemployed coal miner. Coal mines have closed, production levels have
stayed the same, but with mechanization you produce the same with a
third of the workers and, therefore, someone who had worked in coal
and was laid off or fired was probably never going to get his job back.
He was never going to be a coal miner again.
Japanese coal mines are now virtually shut down, but there are no
unemployed coal miners in Japan. There are many former coal miners
who are currently employed, as compared to West Virginia and Penn-
sylvania, where there are former coal miners who are now unemployed
coal miners.
We are unable to retrain our work force. The private sector is
totally unable to do it, and the public sector is unable to do. We have a
textile bill that is proposed in every session of Congress to further
restrict import of textiles. What is driving that? What's driving it is that
38. Ministry of International Trade and Industry.
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we have many unemployed textile workers in the United States and
we've been totally unable to move them, to retrain them, to get them
into a productive life. They are sitting there, and they're unemployed.
There are obvious political pressures.
The U.S. should not, perhaps, be out of the textile industry, but we
should certainly be out of some sectors of the industry. Textile protec-
tion is a substitute for the totally inadequate welfare programs, reeduca-
tion programs, and retraining programs of the government for the last
eight years.
[CALL FOR FINAL REMARKS]
PROFESSOR KOSCHMANN: I think we're getting to a point
where we want to think about where we're going to end up and whether
any of this is going to come together.
Maybe one thing that could be done is that the panel members
should think about what sorts of concluding summaries, syntheses, part-
ing shots, or whatever, they would like to make. I don't know if we'll
have time to give everyone an opportunity to do that. And let me just
bring up a couple of things that have been left out.
We haven't talked very much about macroeconomic coordination.
Am I correct in thinking that this is relatively uncontroversial among the
panelists? A number of things have emerged as controversial: market
share targets, Super 301, and so on. Maybe we should focus on a couple
of things that haven't received a lot of attention.
Mr. Yachi, do you have anything to say about the general problem
of macroeconomic coordination?
[MACROECONOMIC COORDINATION]
MR. YACHI: So far there has been very good macroeconomic pol-
icy coordination among major industrial countries, and although the
pace of discussion in the framework of Uruguay Round has not been so
fast as had been expected, I think that encouraging cooperation and
negotiation is steadily going on there. So far as those aspects are con-
cerned, we could see no serious problem. Japan's contribution in those
fields should be duly appreciated.
PROFESSOR KOSCHMANN: Does anyone have a kind of perspec-
tive on the whole here that they want to share with us?
[GAP BETWEEN POLITICS AND ECONOMICS]
MR. YACHT: After hearing the discussions, I think generally there's
some gap between politics and the economy. The economy, particularly
the international economy, will transcend borders and even nationali-
ties. For instance, multilateral or multinational corporations engaged in
overseas operation are now going to transfer their decision making
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power to the regional center. European regional headquarters can
decide their regional trade and commercial policy independently from
their parent Tokyo headquarters. And the headquarters in Asia could
make a decision without the permission of the headquarters in Tokyo.
This kind of thing is happening on a global scale.
When you talk about the Nissan car produced in the UK, the UK
government deems it a British car, because its local content is 70 per-
cent. The French government, on the other hand, is saying that the
local content should be more than 80 percent for the car to be an EC
car. This is economically nonsense, particularly for consumers.
What I'm trying to say is we are still speaking in the terminology of
the 19th century, or at best the terminology of the pre-war period: ter-
minology based on sovereignty and nationalism. On the other hand,
businessmen and consumers are not paying too much attention to the
traditional political concept and I think this gap is getting bigger and
bigger. We can see vividly this gap in the dichotomy between "Inside
the Beltway" and other parts of the United States. And the problem
which we are facing now is how to coordinate more concretely between
politics and economics, how to make politics catch up with such eco-
nomic developments. I think that's a serious problem now, and I hope
that this kind of thing will be discussed among the panelists present here
in the future.
[U.S. PROBLEMS WITH JAPAN NOT UNIQUE]
MR. WOLF: I'd like to conclude by repeating something I men-
tioned in my initial presentation. We are not dealing with a U.S. versus
Japan problem. We are dealing with issues concerningJapan where that
concern is shared throughout the world. Japan has, thus far, failed to
address those issues. Japan, to play an honored role in the world com-
munity, to play a leadership role in the world community, simply must
address those problems, not just on the bilateral basis with the United
States, but on a bilateral basis with dozens of other countries.
[IMPORTANCE OF ACADEMIC ANALYSIS]
MR. CALDER: I would just like to say one last thing about the rela-
tionship of academic analysis to an understanding of the policy issues we
are discussing. Not simply academic analysis but analysis more gener-
ally. It seems to me that we have a range of tremendously tangled, tre-
mendously important, long-range issues here and I share the frustration
that several of us have with the tension between ideal long-range solu-
tions and the immediacy with which these problems are pressing upon
us, an immediacy which pushes us toward less desirable alternatives.
Of course, we can't as easily deal with immediate issues as with the
alternatives-semiconductors is a clear illustration of that. But one
thing that we can do that may be of use for the long run is generating
more comparative public policy studies or integrated analysis of both
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sector-specific industrial developments and their broader political con-
text. We used to have a U.S.-Japan high-tech working group that dealt
in detail with sectoral issues. Revival of the sort of analysis that looks far
to the future, that looks at how sectors are evolving and how policies
impact on them is important. I think we need some new early-warning
mechanisms.
PROFESSOR KOSCHMANN: Why don't we at this point open up
the floor to those members of the audience who might have some
questions.
[RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN BILATERALISM AND MULTILATERALISM]
MR. PUNKE: 39 The panelists have spent a lot of time discussing
the potential elements of a U.S.-Japan bilateral accord. I wonder if any-
one on the panel believes that a bilateral approach to U.S.-Japanese
trade relations undermines the broader multilateral process. In other
words, if we start cutting bilateral deals, will we destroy the GATT
process?
MR. WOLF: A free trade agreement negotiated bilaterally might,
but if you are talking about the kinds of bilateral negotiations we've had
in the past on specific issues, no. For the most part they don't violate
the GATT rules or ongoing GATT negotiations.
MR. KAPLAN: I think that's an important and interesting question.
I think the GATT to some extent is the least common denominator and
many countries have entered into customs unions or free trade areas or
something with other countries and that has not harmed the GATT
insofar as those agreements are consistent with the GATT. I don't think
it harms the GATT and insofar as there are negotiations where there are
special problems between two trading partners, like on semiconductors
or agricultural negotiations with the Europeans; there's nothing incon-
sistent or harmful about doing that.
I do think there does seem to be a Balkanization of trading going on
right now, more than at any time in recent memory. There's a problem
of Europe '92, people wonder whether that means Europeans are going
to try to concentrate, at least for the forseeable future, on their internal
trading and keep other people backed out. The U.S.-Canada free trade
agreement to some extent was a response to that. And then you have
the problem of a U.S.-Japan free trade agreement. I think if we went
that far there could really seriously be an undermining of the concept of
most favored nation treatment and everybody would be lining up with
"allies."
It's a matter of degree to some extent, but if we really start Balkan-
izing and forming special alliances over time, I think that can be
problematic.
39. Michael Punke, Editor-in-Chief, Coniell Inte'national Law Journal.
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MR. BARCEL6:40 Let me start with a point of view and perhaps we
can pursue it with respect to one or two issues. The point of view is that
multilateralism and free market forces should be the touchstone of for-
eign trade policy. The notion that we have a problem with Japan
because we have a persistent bilateral current account deficit with Japan
doesn't make any sense. I think the point that Allan Wallis made last
night that in his personal finances he runs a lot of the bilateral deficits
with a great many people, but only a few bilateral surplusses,4 1 is very
telling.
Arguments for market access-if they mean guaranteed market
share in bilateral trade-seem to me to lead to quite a mess down the
line if that's what we were to start pushing. Arguments for free trade
agreements-bilateral free trade agreements-also don't seem wise to
me unless they are intended to be a first step toward freer trade at the
multilateral level-which is one of the ways the U.S.-Canada Free Trade
Agreement was promoted in this country. Such an agreement makes
sense if we think of it as a showcase of how we can achieve freer trade
with a friend, a neighbor, so that we can build from there to a multilat-
eral framework. If that's what we are thinking about doing, fine.
If we did that with Japan and then moved to the multilateral frame-
work in GATT with any advances toward freer trade we obtained, that
would seem to me to be fine. So our ultimate goal should be freer trade
at the multilateral level.
Now, to pursue this perspective in the direction of one or two
issues. The bilateral trade deficit with Japan has been asserted to be the
problem. I say it's not the problem. If the U.S. has a trade deficit prob-
lem, then it has a trade deficit problem multilaterally. And if it has such
a problem, the solution is the price of the dollar, the exchange rate.
Now, why isn't that the answer? Let market forces drive the dollar to the
point to which it has to be driven for our trade to balance if we think it's
a problem. Technically, we're in balance right now, as Allan Wallis
pointed out.
Every country is in balance all the time. If market forces begin to
move in a way that requires us to run less of a current account deficit-
which is only part of the overall balance-then we will be forced to buy
less from other countries. The dollar will go down further. If Japan is
selling too much to other countries, the yen has to appreciate until Japa-
nese products get so expensive that countries start buying fewer of them
world wide. If we were running a current account surplus world wide,
we wouldn't care about a bilateral deficit. Why isn't the proper perspec-
tive multilateral rather than bilateral?
MR. MASTEL: I would agree with you that the multilateral system
should be the touchstone of trade policy. The problem is that as a prac-
tical matter it cannot be our only tool and it never has been and in all
40. John J. Barcel6 III, A. Robert Noll Professor of Law, Cornell Law School.
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probability never will be. We've always found it necessary to negotiate
bilaterally with other nations to resolve certain bilateral trade frictions.
We can do that in a way that doesn't undermine the multilateral
system at all, for example, as we did in the beef and citrus agreement
with Japan. We conducted an extensive bilateral negotiation, but the
result was an agreement to liberalize on a most favored nation basis,
which means that all the nations of the world trading system would have
access. The multilateral system should be our touchstone, but it can't be
our only tool.
Further, concerning your point about bilateral deficits not matter-
ing. In theory, you're right. The problem is thatJapan is such a big part
of the world economy and such a large chunk of our trade deficit that it
simply is impossible for us to have multilateral balance and not have
balance or at least reduce the trade deficit with Japan. It's the second
largest economy in the world. It can't be running a $100 billion dollar
surplus every year and if it is we won't be immune from the effects.
MR. BARGELO: What consequences are going to follow from that,
that will be detrimental? We've been running a current account trade
deficit for several years.
MR. MASTEL: Twenty-four years.
MR. BARCELO: What then is the consequent problem that that
leads to?
MR. MASTEL: There are two problems. The first is that although
the capital account and the current account do balance, that doesn't
mean the trade deficit is not a problem. As a practical matter, what
you're talking about is happening every day with Japan. We're buying
Japanese products and the Japanese are buying treasury bills or other-
wise investing in the U.S. economy, so the money is coming back, but
the money is not coming back for free. You have to pay debt service on
the money that Japanese invest in the United States.
MR. BARCELO: Let me interject a point right there, if I may. We
have to pay debt service to anybody who buys T-bills, don't we?
MR. MASTEL: Sure. But there's a difference if the debt service
stays in the United States or if it moves off our shores. When it moves
off shore the benefits don't stay within the United States. Let me
explain.
As our trade deficit has built up year after year, the foreign debt has
built up year after year; in macroeconomic terms we've been borrowing
money from abroad to purchase goods from abroad. The problem with
that approach is that we have to pay that debt off and we have to pay
debt service on it. By the mid-1990s the debt will reach about a trillion
dollars and the debt service that we will be required to pay on that debt
could reduce the U.S. standard of living by 1 or 2 percent.
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In global terms that doesn't matter, but when you're looking at it
from a perspective of a single nation it can have a great effect on what
the standard of living in that nation is. That's why it's important.
MR. BARGELO: What seems to me to be important is the relation-
ship between the GNP and the debt service. I cannot see why it matters
who owns this debt, Japanese, Americans, or anybody else. Are we able
as a government to carry the level of government debt? That seems to
be the important issue. As I say, our perspective should be multilateral
and global.
MR. GARFINKEL: 4 2 This concludes the symposium. I'd like to
thank the audience for its valuable participation. I'd like to thank the
Cornell Law School, Dean Osgood, Linda Majeroni and Kathleen
Rourke. I'd also like to thank the International Law Journal staff for mak-
ing this weekend possible. But mostly I'd like to thank the moderators
and the participants for a wonderfully enjoyable, enlightening, and stim-
ulating weekend. Thank you very much.
PROFESSOR KOSCHMANN: You took the words right out of my
mouth.
42. Neil B. Garfinkel, Symposium Editor, Cornell Internationl Law Journal.
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